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Concepts

Modes and assurance levels

elan1 has two modes and three assurance levels. Mode A (Enforced) runs in-process and holds the write credential; Mode B (Attested advisory) evaluates and records over MCP or HTTP without it. Separately, L1 Guarded, L2 Attested and L3 Proven describe how strongly the evidence can be relied on.

The mode says what elan1 can stop. The level says what a record can prove, and to whom. They are independent, and together they decide every claim you can make about a governed write.

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Two separate questions

ModeWho holds the write credential?A property of the integration. Mode A when elan1 Govern holds the credential to your system of record; Mode B when your system does. It decides whether a write can be stopped or only recorded.
LevelWho can check the record?A property of the evidence. L1 when the chain is tamper-evident to you; L2 when a stranger can check a signed bundle without us; L3 when the record survives the vendor. Levels are levels of a claim, never product tiers.

Neither depends on the other. A Mode B integration can produce L2 evidence: a signed record of writes that elan1 evaluated but could not stop. A Mode A integration at L1 enforces every write, but its record is checkable only with us until L2. The 16 proof-record fields are the same in every combination; at L1 the signature is absent, not stubbed.

In-process SDK

Mode A · Enforced

Mode A · Enforced

“No write reaches the system of record without a gate decision and a proof record.”

In-process SDK. The kernel holds a single-use credential that lasts 10 minutes; your agents never see it. The system of record accepts only kernel-minted tokens that expire in 10 minutes, and each change goes to a sandbox first. This is the only mode in which we use the word enforced.

  • Where it applies today: elan1 Work hosted on ERPNext. Third parties by agreement, after conformance tests C1–C14 pass.
  • What the caller does: sends write intents through the in-process SDK and handles the outcome. It never holds a standing credential to the books.
  • What happens if elan1 is down: allows stop, and changes wait for a person. Nothing writes without a decision, because nothing else holds the credential.

MCP server · HTTP API

Mode B · Attested advisory

Mode B · Attested advisory

“Evaluated against your rules and recorded.”

Over MCP or HTTP. Your code calls elan1 first; elan1 evaluates the write intent and records it, and cannot stop the write.

  • How you connect: the MCP server (34 tools: 18 read, 10 stage, 6 act) or the HTTP API.
  • What the caller does: calls assert before writing, writes only on an allow, waits on an escalation, and stops on a refusal.
  • What is recorded: every attempt, including the ones Govern refused, with the same 16 fields as Mode A.
Where this is weak. Mode B records the write; it cannot stop it. A caller that ignores a refusal can still write, and elan1 will not know unless the caller says so. We never say “blocked” or “prevented” for Mode B, and neither should an integration built on it.

Mode by consumer

Which consumer connects in which mode, and what may be said about its writes
ConsumerModeWhat we may say
elan1 Work, hosted ERPNextMode A · EnforcedNo write reaches the system of record without a gate decision and a proof record.
elan1 Work Attach (your ERPNext)Mode B · Attested advisoryEvaluated against your rules and recorded.
elan1 DecideMode B · Attested advisoryWrites go to Govern as intents; evaluated and recorded.
elan1 Run toolingMode B · Attested advisoryEvaluated and recorded. If elan1 is unreachable, the gate check fails closed.
Third-party agentsMode B · Attested advisory (A by agreement)Mode B, or Mode A by agreement. No claim to run on Govern until conformance tests C1–C14 pass.

Moving a write type to Mode A

Mode is set per write type, so an integration can move one write type at a time. A write type can move from Mode B to Mode A once elan1 can hold its write credential. Before the kernel takes the credential, we plan to ask for:

  1. At least 30 days of recorded Mode B traffic for that write type, so refusal and escalation rates are known before anything is enforced.
  2. A bypass test against the real system: an attempt to write without a gate decision, which must fail once the credential has moved.
  3. A review of the declaration, the approvers and the fail-closed behaviour with the process owner.

Nothing changes in the record shape when a write type moves. What changes is the claim: from “evaluated and recorded” to “enforced”, for records written after the move.

L1, L2 and L3

Each level answers one question. Each adds to the one before; the write path does not change between levels.

Assurance levels: the question each answers, the evidence it adds, and its status
LevelQuestionEvidenceStatus
L1 · GuardedCan I let this run?
The write was controlled.
  • The 16-field proof record, hash-chained per tenant with SHA-256 over a length-prefixed preimage.
  • A record for every refusal as well as every commit; a refusal is metered at 0.4 of a governed action.
  • Gate results, the declaration and policy versions, and the autonomy level, named on every record.
Available
Available
L2 · AttestedCan I hand this over?
A stranger can check that.
  • An Ed25519 signature over the frozen 16-field record, from L2.
  • Merkle roots anchored to two RFC 3161 timestamp authorities within 15 minutes.
  • An eight-member evidence bundle and the free offline verifier, elan1-verify.
Available
Available · signed and checkable offline
L3 · ProvenDoes this survive the vendor?
The record survives us.
  • A second, independent seal implementation that agrees octet for octet.
  • Published test vectors, including a bundle known to be tampered with.
  • A counter-signature by a party that is not elan1.
On auditor acceptance
On auditor acceptance · begins when an outside auditor accepts an L2 bundle in writing
  • L1 Guarded is the baseline level of every governed write, available today. Verification at L1 means recomputing digests and comparing prev_digest; it needs our infrastructure. See Proof record.
  • L2 Attested adds signing, anchoring to two RFC 3161 timestamp authorities and the free offline verifier. Available today.
  • L3 Proven is reached on auditor acceptance. It begins when an outside auditor accepts an L2 bundle in writing, an event we do not control, so it carries no date.

What each combination may say

The sentence an operator, an auditor or your own product may use, for each level and mode, and what it must not imply.

Claims by assurance level and integration mode
LevelMode A · EnforcedMode B · Attested advisory
L1 Guarded

“Our agents cannot write to our books without passing rules we set. A person approves anything material. We hold a tamper-evident record of every attempt, including the refusals.”

Cannot claim

  • That the record is signed or checkable offline. That comes with L2.
  • That someone who does not trust elan1 can check it. At L1, verification needs us.
  • That it satisfies a regulation on its own. It serves as an internal control.

“Every write intent our agents send is evaluated against rules we set and recorded, including the refusals. The record is tamper-evident to us.”

Cannot claim

  • That a write was stopped or blocked. Mode B records the write; it cannot stop it.
  • That the record is signed or checkable offline. That comes with L2.
  • That nothing happened outside elan1. Your system holds the credential.
L2 Attested

“No write reached our books without a gate decision and a proof record, and here is a signed bundle you can check on your own machine, without our vendor's help.”

Cannot claim

  • That records written before the upgrade are attested. They stay L1.
  • That the transaction was genuine, or that the rules were adequate.
  • That the record outlives the vendor. That is L3.

“Every write intent was evaluated against our rules and recorded, and here is a signed bundle you can check on your own machine. It records our system's writes; it did not stop them.”

Cannot claim

  • That a write was enforced. Mode B stays attested advisory at every level.
  • That the transaction was genuine, or that the rules were adequate.
  • That the record outlives the vendor. That is L3.
L3 Proven

“The format is published, so the record can be checked in ten years whether or not elan1 exists, and no write reached our books without a gate decision.”

Cannot claim

  • That a regulator has approved it. None has.
  • That the transaction was genuine.
  • A date. L3 begins on an event, not a date.

“The format is published, so the record of every evaluated write intent can be checked whether or not elan1 exists.”

Cannot claim

  • That a write was enforced. Mode B stays attested advisory.
  • That a regulator has approved it. None has.
  • A date. L3 begins on an event, not a date.

Upgrades and old records

  • Moving from L1 to L2 signs only the records written after the upgrade. Records written at L1 stay L1, and are labelled L1 for good. Nothing re-signs history.
  • Moving a write type from Mode B to Mode A changes the claim only for records written after the credential moved. Earlier records remain “evaluated and recorded”.
  • Signing keys are held per residency domain. India first: domain “in”.

Wording rules for builders

If your product writes through elan1 Govern, the claims you make to your own customers inherit these limits. We hold our own site to the same register.

Claim words and the level or mode at which each may be used
WordAllowed atWhat it means
“tamper-evident”L1 and aboveAny change to a past record is evident to the tenant, because the chain no longer recomputes.
“enforced”Mode A onlyGovern holds the write credential, so no write reaches the system of record without a gate decision.
“evaluated and recorded”Mode B (and Mode A)Every write intent was checked against your rules and left a proof record.
“signed”From L2The record's digest carries an Ed25519 signature, one key per residency domain.
“checkable offline”From L2An evidence bundle can be verified on an air-gapped machine with the free verifier, without us.
“survives the vendor”L3 (on auditor acceptance)Only after an outside auditor has accepted an L2 bundle in writing.

Never used, at any level or mode:

  • any word that says a record cannot be altered — we claim that a change shows, not that change is impossible
  • any claim of certification, a guarantee or admissibility in court
  • “blocked” or “prevented” for a Mode B write
  • “runs on elan1” for an agent that has not passed C1–C14

None of the levels makes you compliant with a regulation on its own, proves that a transaction was genuine, or proves that your rules were adequate.

The full register is on What we claim.

// COMPARE

Switch the level and mode, and read the claim.

The interactive comparison shows what each level and mode lets you say, and what it does not.